Concepts, Not Nomenclature: Universal Injunctions, Declaratory Judgments, Opinions and Precedent by Wasserman, Howard
Florida International University College of Law 
eCollections 
Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship 
2020 
Concepts, Not Nomenclature: Universal Injunctions, Declaratory 
Judgments, Opinions and Precedent 
Howard Wasserman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ecollections.law.fiu.edu/faculty_publications 
 Part of the Courts Commons 
DATE DOWNLOADED: Wed Sep  9 15:30:57 2020
SOURCE: Content Downloaded from HeinOnline
Citations:
Bluebook 21st ed.
			                                                                
Howard M. Wasserman, Concepts, Not Nomenclature: Universal Injunctions, Declaratory
Judgments, Opinions and Precedent, 91 U. COLO. L. REV. 999 (2020).                   
ALWD 6th ed.                                                                         
Wasserman, H. M., Concepts, not nomenclature: Universal injunctions, declaratory
judgments, opinions and precedent, 91(3) U. Colo. L. Rev. 999 (2020).                
APA 7th ed.                                                                          
Wasserman, H. M. (2020). Concepts, not nomenclature: Universal injunctions,
declaratory judgments, opinions and precedent. University of Colorado Law Review,
91(3), 999-[xii].                                                                    
Chicago 7th ed.                                                                      
Howard M. Wasserman, "Concepts, Not Nomenclature: Universal Injunctions, Declaratory
Judgments, Opinions and Precedent," University of Colorado Law Review 91, no. 3
(Summer 2020): 999-[xii]                                                             
McGill Guide 9th ed.                                                                 
Howard M Wasserman, "Concepts, Not Nomenclature: Universal Injunctions, Declaratory
Judgments, Opinions and Precedent" (2020) 91:3 U Colo L Rev 999.                     
MLA 8th ed.                                                                          
Wasserman, Howard M. "Concepts, Not Nomenclature: Universal Injunctions, Declaratory
Judgments, Opinions and Precedent." University of Colorado Law Review, vol. 91, no.
3, Summer 2020, p. 999-[xii]. HeinOnline.                                            
OSCOLA 4th ed.                                                                       
Howard M Wasserman, 'Concepts, Not Nomenclature: Universal Injunctions, Declaratory
Judgments, Opinions and Precedent' (2020) 91 U Colo L Rev 999
Provided by: 
FIU College of Law
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and 
   Conditions of the license agreement available at 
https://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from  uncorrected OCR text.







INTRODUCTION .................................... ...... 999
I. "UNIVERSAL" OR "NON-PARTICULARIZED," NOT
"NATIONWIDE," PERHAPS MERELY "INJUNCTIONS" ........ 1004
A. Where ............................. ..... 1004
B. Who .................................... 1006
C. Eliminating Qualifiers ................. ..... 1010
II. UNIVERSAL DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS? . . . . . . .  . . . . . .1012
III. JUDGMENTS AND OPINIONS, PRECLUSION AND
PRECEDENT ................................... ...... 1016
A. Judgments .......................... ..... 1017
B. Opinions. ................................. 1021
C. Judgments, Opinions, and Non-Particularity ......... 1023
IV. AN UNNECESSARY DISTRACTION .................... 1029
CONCLUSION ...................................... .......1033
INTRODUCTION
The battle lines are drawn on the permissibility and validity
of so-called "nationwide" injunctions-injunctions in federal con-
stitutional litigation purporting to halt government enforcement
of a challenged law1 against all possible targets of that law and
to protect all rights holders against enforcement, not only the
parties to the action. Courts are divided-some granting,2 with
*Professor of Law, FIU College of Law. Thanks to Suzette Malveaux, the University
of Colorado Law School, and the University of Colorado Law Review for inviting me
to participate in the 2019 Rothgerber Constitutional Law Conference.
1. "Law" throughout the paper includes all enforceable legal rules regardless
of source: statutes, administrative regulations and policies, executive policies and
orders, and judge-made common law.
2. E.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d
476, 511-12 (9th Cir. 2018); Pennsylvania v. Trump, 351 F. Supp. 3d 791, 830-35
(E.D. Pa. 2019); Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen, 279 F. Supp. 3d 401, 437-38 (E.D.N.Y.
2018); City of Chicago v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d 933, 951-52 (N.D. Ill. 2017); City
of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 539-40 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
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attempts at justification,3 others rejecting, in practice if not in
concept.4 Justices Thomas and Gorsuch have weighed in against
them.5 Scholars supporting their validity6 and scholars rejecting
them as impermissible7 have made their positions known.
I have staked my position in the impermissible camp:8 A
court order should protect rights-holders who are parties to a
particular case against enforcement efforts by government offi-
cials who are also parties to that case. A court order should
protect no further.
The requirement that remedies be particularized and lim-
ited to the parties arises from the judicial process in which
constitutional review and adjudication occur. That process offers
3. E.g., Pennsylvania, 351 F. Supp. 3d at 830-35; City of Chicago v. Sessions,
2017 WL 4572208, *4 (N.D. Ill. 2017).
4. E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr, 934 F.3d 1026, 1028-30 (9th Cir. 2019);
California v. Health & Human Servs., 351 F. Supp. 3d 1267, 1300 (N.D. Cal. 2019);
see also City of Chicago v. Sessions, 321 F. Supp. 3d 855, 881 (N.D. Ill. 2018)
(staying nationwide scope of injunction).
5. Dep't of Homeland Security v. New York, 140 S. Ct. 599, 600 (2020)
(Gorsuch, J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring in the grant of stay); Trump v.
Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2424-25 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring); but see id. at 2446
n. 13 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
6. E.g., Zachary D. Clopton, National Injunctions and Preclusion, 118 MICH.
L. REV. 1, 5-7 (2019); Amanda Frost, In Defense of Nationwide Injunctions, 93
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1065, 1069 (2018); Suzette M. Malveaux, Class Actions, Civil Rights,
and the National Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. F. 56 (2017); Portia Pedro, Toward
Establishing a Pre-Extinction Definition of "Nationwide Injunctions," 91 U. COLO.
L. REV. 847 (2020); James E. Pfander & Jacob Wentzel, The Common Law Origins
of Ex Parte Young, STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 56-57); Mila
Sohoni, The Lost History of the "Universal" Injunction, 133 HARV. L. REV. 920, 924
(2020); Alan M. Trammell, Demystifying Nationwide Injunctions, 98 TEX. L. REV.
67, 73-74 (2019).
7. E.g., DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 436 (4th ed. 2010);
Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131
HARv. L. REV. 417, 469 (2017); Ronald A. Cass, Nationwide Injunctions' Governance
Problems: Forum-Shopping, Politicizing Courts, and Eroding Constitutional
Structure, 27 GEO. MASON L. REV. (forthcoming 2020); Michael T. Morley,
Disaggregating Nationwide Injunctions, 71 ALA. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (2019) [hereinafter
Morley, Disaggregating]; Michael T. Morley, Nationwide Injunctions, Rule 23(b)(2),
and the Remedial Powers of the Lower Courts, 97 B.U. L. REV. 615, 620 (2017)
[hereinafter Morley, Nationwide]; Howard M. Wasserman, Precedent, Non-
Universal Injunctions, and Judicial Departmentalism: A Model of Constitutional
Adjudication, 23 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1077, 1080-81, 1093-94 (2020)
[hereinafter Wasserman, Departmentalism]; Howard M. Wasserman, "Nationwide"
Injunctions Are Really "Universal" Injunctions and They Are Never Appropriate, 22
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 335, 353 (2018) [hereinafter Wasserman, "Nationwide'".
8. Wasserman, Departmentalism, supra note 7, at 1080-81, 1093-94;
Wasserman, "Nationwide", supra note 7, at 353.
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rights-holders two ways to challenge enforcement of a constitu-
tionally invalid law.
The first is defensively. The rights-holder is a defendant in
a proceeding to enforce some law and raises the constitutional
defect in that law as a defense against enforcement. This could
be government-initiated proceedings against X, whether crimi-
nal,9 civil,' 0 or administrative,11 or it could be private civil liti-
gation against X.12 In either context, X challenges the constitu-
tional validity of the law being enforced; a court agreeing with
X's constitutional defense will dismiss the enforcement action or
otherwise enter judgment for X.
The second is offensively. The rights-holder initiates a pre-
enforcement federal constitutional challenge to the law. X sues
the government or, more commonly, the executive official re-
sponsible for enforcing the law in what often is labeled an Ex
parte Young action. 13 X must seek prospective relief-a declara-
tory judgmentl4 that a law is constitutionally invalid and cannot
be enforced by the defendant against the plaintiff, an injunction
prohibiting enforcement of that law against the plaintiff,1 5 or
both. 16 Many cases produce anti-suit injunctions, with the court
issuing a prohibitory (or negative) injunction preventing the de-
fendant official from initiating a judicial proceeding to enforce
the law against the rights-holder.17 But Ex parte Young pre-en-
forcement litigation extends to efforts to stop enforcement of any
law, regardless of how that law would be enforced.18
9. E.g., Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211 (2014); United States v. Stevens,
559 U.S. 460 (2010); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
10. E.g., United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013); cf. Huffman v. Pursue
Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604-05 (1975).
11. E.g., Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm'n v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S.
423 (1982).
12. E.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011); Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
13. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
14. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (2018).
15. E.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S.
844 (1997); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975); Steffel v. Thompson, 415
U.S. 452 (1974).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a).
17. Bray, supra note 7, at 449-50; John Harrison, Ex Parte Young, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 989, 990, 1014-15 (2008); Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart ("VOPA"),
563 U.S. 247, 262 (2011) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
18. VOPA, 563 U.S. at 256-57; Pfander & Wentzel, supra note 6 (manuscript
at 49); see, e.g., United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S. Ct. 1532 (2018); City of
2020] 1001
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Whether the constitutional defect is raised offensively or de-
fensively, the court must interpret the Constitution and decide
whether the underlying law being enforced is consistent with the
Constitution. A law might be invalid because it exceeds internal
limits on the government's power to enact laws (such as from the
Commerce Clause or federalism principles),19 or because it vio-
lates external limits on the government's power arising from
provisions creating individual rights (such as the First or Four-
teenth Amendments).20
Non-particularized remedies-the subject of this judicial
and academic debate-arise in the offensive context. But if a
court agrees that a law is constitutionally defective, either con-
text should produce the same result: an opinion declaring the
law constitutionally invalid and a judgment premised on that
conclusion, prohibiting continued and future enforcement as to
the parties to the action. Regardless of remedy-dismissal of on-
going enforcement or injunction prohibiting future enforce-
ment-the judgments should have the same scope. Samuel Bray
and Douglas Laycock separately explain the appropriate scope
of judicial remedies. Bray argues that a "federal court should
give an injunction that protects the plaintiff vis-A-vis the defend-
ant."2 1 Laycock explains that "the court in an individual action
should not globally prohibit a government agency from enforcing
an invalid regulation; the court should order only that the inva-
lid regulation not be enforced against the individual plaintiff." 22
From that starting point, this Article explores four subsidi-
ary issues on the scope of injunctions in constitutional cases. All
relate to the fact that judicial review occurs in particular litiga-
tion and procedural contexts.
Part I considers what to call these beyond-the-plaintiffs in-
junctions. The term that has carried the day in the courts is "na-
tionwide,"23 with many scholars following suit.24 Bray offers
Chicago v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d 933 (N.D. Ill. 2017); Miller v. Davis, 123 F.
Supp. 3d 924 (E.D. Ky. 2015).
19. Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 214 (2014); United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598, 601-02 (2000).
20. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608; United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 481-
82 (2010); ACLU, 521 U.S. at 849; Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
21. Bray, supra note 7, at 469.
22. LAYCOCK, supra note 7, at 276.
23. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2424-25 n.1 (2018) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
24. See Frost, supra note 6, at 1071; Trammell, supra note 6, at 67-71.
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"national" injunction2 5 as a close alternative. Justice Thomas
adopted "universal" in his concurring opinion in Trump v. Ha-
waii,2 6 Justice Gorsuch called them "cosmic" 2 7 (although it
appears he was joking), and they agreed these injunctions suf-
fered from the "same basic flaw" regardless of framing as
universal, cosmic, or nationwide.28 Michael Morley focuses on
whether the injunction is plaintiff-oriented or defendant-
oriented.29 Another conception emphasizes the injunction's par-
ticularity, whether it is particularized to the parties to the case
or not particularized to any parties.30 Nomenclature matters be-
cause the correct terminology exposes the real issues, avoids
judicial confusion over those issues, and may, in turn, eliminate
the need for any terminology.
Part II explores the unique role and status of a different
remedy that a court might issue in a pre-enforcement challenge
to the enforceability of a constitutionally invalid law: the declar-
atory judgment-a declaration of the rights and legal relations
of the parties3 1-which has developed into a tool to obtain a ju-
dicial declaration on the constitutional validity of a law. 32
Part III emphasizes the distinction between two products of
a judicial decision: the judgment resolving the dispute in a par-
ticular case and imposing a party-specific remedy and the opin-
ion explaining that judgment. Each carries distinct meanings,
characteristics, and consequences. Conflation of these products
produces some confusion among courts and commentators, in-
cluding assigning to the judgment the legal consequences and
effects of the opinion.
Part IV shows why the debate over universal or nationwide
scope is an unnecessary and unfortunate distraction, diverting
courts and litigants from the real issues and producing layers of
confusion in constitutional adjudication.
25. Bray, supra note 7, at 419, 419 n.5.
26. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2424-25, n.1; see also Wasserman, "Nationwide",
supra note 7, at 350.
27. Transcript of Oral Argument at 72-73, Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (No. 17-
965).
28. Dep't of Homeland Security v. New York, 140 S. Ct. 599, 600 (2020)
(Gorsuch, J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring in the grant of stay).
29. Morley, Disaggregating, supra note 7, at 9-10; Morley, Nationwide, supra
note 7, at 621.
30. Wasserman, Departmentalism, supra note 7, at 1094-95.
31. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2018).
32. John Harrison, Severability, Remedies, and Constitutional Adjudication, 83
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 56, 82-83, 83 n.130 (2014).
2020] 1003
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I. "UNIVERSAL" OR "NON-PARTICULARIZED," NOT
"NATIONWIDE," PERHAPS MERELY "INJUNCTIONS"
The confusion over nomenclature-over the competing
terms for orders that extend beyond the plaintiffs-relates to a
separate confusion over distinct elements of an injunction: "who"
and "where."
"Who" refers to the persons bound and protected by a judg-
ment-who is controlled and subject to the limitations of the or-
der and bound to act or refrain from acting in some respect,33 as
well as who enjoys the blanket of the court's protection and its
power to enforce the judgment if it is disobeyed.34 "Where" refers
to the "territorial breadth" or geographic scope of the court order,
where the judgment and court's enforcement power can find and
act with respect to those bound or protected by an injunction. In
pre-enforcement constitutional litigation, "who" means against
what persons government is barred from enforcing the chal-
lenged law and against what persons government remains free
from judicial decree to enforce the challenged law; "where"
means the place in the world in which the government is barred
from enforcing the law against that "who" the injunction pro-
tects. The former element is not about geographic applicability,
but about the "particular people or entities whose rights they are
tailored to enforce."35
A. Where
"Nationwide" best describes an injunction's "where"-the
"geographical bounds" of the plaintiffs injury and of the remedy
for the plaintiffs injury. So understood, all injunctions are and
should be nationwide. All injunctions protect the plaintiff
against the defendants' unconstitutional or unlawful conduct
everywhere the plaintiff may be or may go. That is, government
officials are and should be prohibited from enforcing the consti-
tutionally defective law against the protected party wherever
the protected party may be or may go. A rights-holder's rights
are violated by threatened enforcement of a constitutionally de-
fective law wherever she goes, and the injunction protecting her
against those violations protects her wherever she goes. All in-
33. See FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2).
34. Bray, supra note 7, at 419 n.5.
35. Morley, Disaggregating, supra note 7, at 9.
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junctions thus extend beyond the geographical bounds of the
issuing judicial district or affirming judicial circuit.
A simple case illustrates the point. The Northwest Immi-
grant Rights Project (NWIRP) filed suit in federal court, seeking
to halt enforcement of certain regulations in immigration pro-
ceedings; those regulations required attorneys to file a notice of
appearance (and provide full legal representation), even when
seeking to offer incidental advice to parties otherwise appearing
pro se. NWIRP could not afford to provide full representation in
every case, so the regulations' effect was to stop NWIRP from
providing incidental assistance. NWIRP alleged the regulations
violated the First Amendment-by interfering with communica-
tions between it and parties to immigration proceedings-and
the Tenth Amendment-by infringing on the state power to reg-
ulate attorneys.36
The district court enjoined enforcement of the regulations
against NWIRP, making it properly and appropriately nation-
wide. In prohibiting the federal government from enforcing the
attorney regulations against NWIRP, the district court neces-
sarily prohibited enforcement of the regulations against NWIRP
anywhere in the United States where NWIRP might attempt to
provide legal services in immigration proceedings. The organi-
zation operated in Washington state,37 so the injunction obvi-
ously prohibited enforcement in proceedings held there. But if
NWIRP were to begin providing legal services in immigration
proceedings in Oregon or Texas or Florida or Maine, the injunc-
tion would bar enforcement of the regulations in those proceed-
ings, and attempted enforcement in those places would violate
the Washington-based injunction. The protection that the in-
junction affords NWIRP against enforcement follows NWIRP
wherever it might otherwise be subject to enforcement of the
challenged law. This is neither exceptional nor controversial. A
court would not call this a "nationwide" injunction since the na-
tionwide scope of the protection for NWIRP would be under-
stood-the court would call it an injunction.
An injunction prohibiting enforcement of a state law should
be as nationwide as an injunction prohibiting enforcement of fed-
eral law-it protects the plaintiff against enforcement of the con-
stitutionally defective state law everywhere she is or might go.
36. N.w. Immigrant Rights Project v. Sessions, 2017 WL 3189032, *2-6 (W.D.
Wash. 2017).
37. Id. at *1.
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In practice, nationwide scope presents less of a practical problem
because of constitutional and prudential limits on extraterrito-
rial application of state law. Those limits render it unnecessary
for the injunction to protect nationwide; it does not render this
conception of nationwide inapplicable. If a court enjoins Florida
officials from enforcing a Florida law prohibiting flag burning
against the plaintiff, the injunction prohibits Florida officials
from enforcing that law anywhere the plaintiff might burn a flag,
including outside Florida. Limits on extraterritorial application
of Florida's flag-burning law-Florida cannot prosecute someone
who burns a flag in Texas for violating Florida law-add an ad-
ditional prohibition on that enforcement.
B. Who
The significant feature at the heart of this legal and schol-
arly controversy is the injunction's "who"-when an injunction
prohibits, or purports to prohibit, enforcement of the challenged
law against the universe of people who might be subject to en-
forcement of that challenged law, whether parties to the
constitutional litigation or otherwise. During argument in
Trump v. Hawaii, Justice Gorsuch recognized the problem as in-
junctions that are "not limited to relief for the parties at issue"
stopping enforcement of "a federal statute with regard to any-
body anywhere in the world." 3 8 Because "nationwide" describes
"where" and the real problem is the injunction's broad "who," dif-
ferent terminology becomes necessary.
"Universal" works well because the injunctions prohibit en-
forcement of the challenged law against the universe of people-
parties or otherwise-against whom the challenged law might
be enforced. I have urged that term for several years,39 Justice
Thomas adopted it as the appropriate term,4 0 and Justice Gor-
such appeared to have been joking when he labeled these injunc-
tions "cosmic."4 1
Further consideration reveals that "universal" is incom-
plete. An injunction might prohibit enforcement of a law against
38. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 27, at 72-73.
39. Wasserman, "Nationwide", supra note 7, at 350.
40. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2424-25 n.1 (2018) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
41. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 27, at 72-73; see also Dep't of
Homeland Security v. New York, 140 S. Ct. 599, 600 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring
in the grant of stay).
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rights holders other than the plaintiff without being universal-
the injunction might protect some rights-holders other than the
parties without protecting all right-holders. An injunction pro-
tecting the plaintiff and ten nonparties is not universal,
although it would be impermissibly overbroad in scope.
The appropriate terminology must capture all injunctions
that protect beyond the plaintiff-those that prohibit enforce-
ment against the universe and those that prohibit enforcement
against more than the plaintiff but less than the universe. We
thus might distinguish "particularized" injunctions from "non-
particularized" injunctions. A particularized injunction's protec-
tions are particularized to the parties to the action, but not be-
yond, consistent with a judicial remedy benefitting the plaintiff
"in particular."42 A non-particularized injunction's protections
extend beyond the plaintiffs-whether to the universe or to some
group larger than the plaintiffs but smaller than the universe.43
Stephen Viadeck offers "categorical" to describe the injunction
prohibiting all enforcement of the challenged law, regardless of
the government's target.44
Morley's focus on the injunction's "orientation" captures all
overbroad injunctions, whether universal or non-universal-but-
beyond-the-plaintiff. A plaintiff-oriented injunction "vindicates
the plaintiffs' rights, but otherwise leaves the underlying statute
or regulation undisturbed,"45 the equivalent of a particularized
injunction. A defendant-oriented injunction "completely pro-
hibit[s] the defendant agency or official from enforcing a
challenged provision against anyone throughout the state or na-
tion,"46 the equivalent of a non-particularized injunction.
A court might impose an injunction that is both permissibly
nationwide and impermissibly universal/non-particularized. In-
junctions are nationwide when they protect the named plaintiffs
against enforcement of the constitutionally invalid law through-
out the nation, wherever the plaintiffs are or might go; this is
proper and unremarkable. Injunctions are non-particularized
42. Kanuszewski v. Mich. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 927 F.3d 396, 426
(6th Cir. 2019) (Rogers, J., concurring).
43. Wasserman, Departmentalism, supra note 7, at 1093-94.
44. Stephen I. Viadeck, The Solicitor General and the Shadow Docket, 133
HARV. L. REV. 123, 139 (2019).
45. Michael T. Morley, DeFacto Class Actions? Plaintiff- and Defendant-
Oriented Injunctions in Voting Rights, Election Law, and Other Constitutional
Cases, 39 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 487, 500 (2016).
46. Id.; Morley, Nationwide, supra note 7, at 616.
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when they protect nonparties-people other than the named
plaintiffs-against enforcement of the constitutionally defective
law throughout the nation. This is the point of controversy.
Any term-universal, non-particularized, categorical, de-
fendant-oriented-also works regardless of the source of the
challenged law. An injunction prohibiting enforcement of a state
law can be universal/non-particularized, just as an injunction
prohibiting enforcement of a federal law can be universal/non-
particularized. The difference is the size of the universes against
whom enforcement is proscribed. Because federal law has
broader reach than state law, the universe of people subject to
enforcement of federal regulations governing immigration pro-
ceedingS47 or federal regulations repealing the mandate that
employer-provided insurance cover contraception48 is broader
than the universe of people subject to enforcement of any state
law. And the scope of an overbroad injunction prohibiting en-
forcement of federal law is broader than the scope of an over-
broad injunction prohibiting enforcement of a state law.
For example, in Koontz v. Watson, the District of Kansas de-
clared constitutionally invalid a Kansas law requiring all per-
sons who contract with the state to certify that they were not
involved in boycotts of the State of Israel.49 The plaintiff, a
teacher hired to conduct teacher-training programs, alleged that
the law violated the First Amendment, and the court agreed.50
The injunction prohibited the state from enforcing any statute,
law, policy, or practice requiring independent contractors to de-
clare that they are not participating in a boycott of Israel and
prohibited the state "from requiring any independent contrac-
tor" to certify that they are not participating in a boycott of Israel
as a condition of contracting with the state.5 1 That injunction
was universal/non-particularized-prohibiting enforcement of
all state laws against the universe of potential state contractors,
regardless of who those contractors are, where they are, what
they are contracting for, and what laws they are subject to. But
it protected a smaller universe.
47. Northwest Immigrant Rights Project v. Sessions, No. C17-716, 2017 WL
3189032, at *6-7 (W.D. Wash. July 27, 2017).
48. Compare California v. Health & Human Servs., 351 F. Supp. 3d 1267, 1300
(N.D. Cal. 2019), with Pennsylvania v. Trump, 351 F. Supp. 3d 791, 830-31 (E.D.
Pa. 2019).
49. 283 F. Supp. 3d 1007, 1012-13 (D. Kan. 2018).
50. Id. at 1012.
51. Id. at 1027.
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Morley argues that the nomenclature discussion errs in
looking for a single term, when the debate is over five distinct
types of injunctions: (1) nationwide plaintiff-oriented injunc-
tions, prohibiting enforcement of the challenged law against the
plaintiff wherever she is; (2) nationwide plaintiff-class injunc-
tions, prohibiting enforcement of the challenged law against all
members of a civil-rights injunctive class certified under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2); 52 (3) nationwide associational
injunctions, prohibiting enforcement of the challenged law
against members of a plaintiff association;53 (4) nationwide de-
fendant-oriented injunctions, prohibiting the defendant govern-
ment from enforcing the challenged law against any person, any
place; and (5) nationwide defendant-class injunctions, prohibit-
ing a class of defendants from enforcing the challenged law
against the plaintiff. 54 He argues that the first three are proper
if the plaintiff can satisfy certain requirements, while the fourth
is not appropriate, and the fifth is controversial.5 5 Morley's
framework provides helpful specificity, while capturing the es-
sential point that all injunctions should be nationwide in their
"where," but particularized in their "who."
Recent litigation within the Ninth Circuit demonstrates the
mischief when courts fail to use the proper terminology. Four
asylum-advocacy organizations sued to stop enforcement of
Trump Administration regulations requiring those seeking asy-
lum in the United States to first seek asylum in a third coun-
try.56 The district court enjoined enforcement of the regulations,
making the injunction "nationwide" because the Ninth Circuit
had "consistently recognized the authority of district courts to
enjoin unlawful policies on a universal basis."5 7 In that
sentence, the district court demonstrated the nomenclature
confusion at the heart of this legal debate-using nationwide
and universal as synonyms when they cover distinct aspects of
the court order.
The Ninth Circuit granted in part a motion to stay the in-
junction pending appeal. The injunction remained in effect
52. Cf. Wasserman, "Nationwide", supra note 7, at 366-69.
53. Id. at 368-69.
54. Morley, Disaggregating, supra note 7, at 9-10.
55. Id.
56. E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr, 391 F. Supp. 3d 974, 976 (N.D. Cal.
2019); E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr, 385 F. Supp. 3d 922, 929-30, 960 (N.D.
Cal. 2019).
57. E. Bay, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 960.
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within the Ninth Circuit, but the court stayed the injunction to
the extent it applied outside the Ninth Circuit, "because the na-
tionwide scope of the injunction is not supported by the record
as it stands."58
But the Ninth Circuit left the district court with jurisdiction
to "further develop the record in support of a preliminary injunc-
tion extending beyond the Ninth Circuit." 59 The district court
accepted the invitation, offering factual support for reinstating
the injunction's original scope. That factual support focused on
the extent to which some of the California-based plaintiff organ-
izations provided representation and educational programs to
asylum-seekers in states outside the Ninth Circuit.6 0
The Ninth Circuit's stay produced relief that was over- and
under-protective. It was over-protective by leaving in place an
unstayed injunction protecting not only the four plaintiffs but
also the non-particularized universe of enforcement targets
within the Ninth Circuit. It was under-protective by failing to
protect the named plaintiffs, who were affected by the chal-
lenged regulations outside the Ninth Circuit, wherever they
operated. In other words, it produced injunctive relief that was
insufficiently nationwide to accord the plaintiffs complete relief
while being too universal/non-particularized in protecting non-
plaintiffs.
By contrast, the district court performed the appropriate
analysis in supplementing the record. It focused on the location
of the four named plaintiffs, who operated and suffered injury
outside the Ninth Circuit and who needed nationwide protection
in other states.6 1 In other words, it focused on the geographic
scope of the plaintiffs' activities and thus the nationwide scope
of an injunction that could protect them in those activities. And
the district court never mentioned protecting nonparties, who
should not have been within the scope of any court order.
C. Eliminating Qualifiers
While Morley adds more nomenclature, perhaps the search
for correct nomenclature is misguided. Rather than label injunc-
58. E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr, 934 F.3d 1026, 1028-29 (9th Cir. 2019).
59. Id. at 1030-31.
60. E. Bay, 391 F. Supp. 3d at 982-84.
61. This point was rendered moot when the Supreme Court stayed the
injunction in full. Barr v. E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant 140 S. Ct. 3 (2019).
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tions as "nationwide" or "universal" or "plaintiff-class-oriented"
or "non-particularized," we should, as Portia Pedro argues, call
them "injunctions," without misleading, inaccurate, undefined,
and undefinable qualifiers.62 That is possible, however, only
with agreement on and understanding of the definition and ap-
propriate scope of an injunction.63 The "universal" or "non-
particularized" label attaches when courts attempt to stretch
their orders beyond that appropriate scope. The label is neces-
sary to describe and criticize an erroneously broad order.
If Justices Thomas and Gorsuch64 and scholars such as
Bray, Cass, Morley, and myself65 are correct about the limited
remedial power of federal courts in constitutional litigation, the
scope-of-injunction debate reduces to two points. First, a judicial
remedy is particularized to the litigation at issue and therefore
to the parties to that litigation; 66 an injunction should protect
the plaintiffs against enforcement, but no further. Second, that
injunction should protect the plaintiffs (however defined) wher-
ever in the nation they find themselves.6 7 In other words, the
nationwide piece of that injunction is necessary and appropriate
in every case; the universal/non-particularized (or defendant-
oriented) piece of the injunction is unnecessary and inappropri-
ate in every case.68
To render labels unnecessary, courts and commentators
must agree that every injunction has a nationwide "where" and
a non-universal/particularized "who." An "injunction," unquali-
fied, in a case brought by X would prohibit the government from
enforcing the law against X anywhere X is or might go. That in-
junction, unqualified, would be silent and inapplicable as to Y.
62. Pedro, supra note 6, 863-64, 868-69.
63. Id. at 69.
64. Dep't of Homeland Security v. New York, 140 S. Ct. 599, 600 (2020)
(Gorsuch, J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring in the grant of stay); Trump v.
Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2424-25 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring).
65. Bray, supra note 7, at 469; Cass, supra note 7, at 5; Morley, Nationwide,
supra note 7, at 616; Morley, Disaggregating, supra note 7, at 7-8; Wasserman,
"Nationwide", supra note 7, at 353; Wasserman, Departmentalism, supra note 7, at
1093-94.
66. William Baude, The Judgment Power, 98 GEO. L.J. 1807, 1811 (2008); Bray,
supra note 7, at 469; Robert. J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts
and the Structural Constitution, 86 IOwA L. REV. 735, 860 (2001).
67. Bray, supra note 7, at 469.
68. This is subject to litigation and procedural mechanisms, expanding who
qualifies as the plaintiffs so as to gain the protections of the injunction. Wasserman,
Departmentalism, supra note 7, at 1098-1104; Wasserman, "Nationwide", supra
note 7, at 366-75.
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The law remains on the books, enforceable against everyone
other than X.69 As the Supreme Court explained in Doran v. Sa-
lem Inn,70 "neither declaratory nor injunctive relief can directly
interfere with enforcement of contested statutes or ordinances
except with respect to the particular federal plaintiffs, and the
State is free to prosecute others who may violate the statute."7 1
II. UNIVERSAL DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS?
The scope-of-judgment controversy has focused on univer-
sal/non-particularized injunctions. But an injunction is not the
only available remedy in pre-enforcement Ex parte Young ac-
tions. A court also may grant a declaratory judgment-an order
"declar[ing] the rights and other legal relations of any interested
party seeking such declaration"-alone or with an injunction. 72
In Steffel v. Thompson, the Supreme Court explained that
Congress created the declaratory judgment in 1934 as a delayed
reaction to the "storm of controversy" that followed Ex parte
Young in 1908 and to legislative hostility toward the power of
federal district courts to enjoin enforcement of constitutionally
invalid state or federal laws.73 A declaratory judgment repre-
sents a "milder alternative" to the "strong medicine" of an in-
junction-a federal court engages in judicial review and pro-
nounces that a law is constitutionally invalid and should not be
enforced, without imposing the coercive hammer of an injunc-
tion. A declaratory judgment is less intrusive on states and po-
litical branches because the court does not prohibit enforcement
of the law, it only opines on the law's constitutional validity and
enforceability. A declaratory judgment is less coercive because it
is not immediately enforceable through contempt if the govern-
ment disregards the declaration or continues enforcing the chal-
lenged law. 74 Declaratory judgments function through persua-
69. Harrison, supra note 32, at 87-88.
70. 422 U.S. 922 (1975).
71. Id. at 931.
72. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2018).
73. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 466-67 (1974). Congress responded one
year after Exparte Young by creating three-judge district courts for actions seeking
injunctions against enforcement of state laws, 28 U.S.C. § 2281, later extending it
to actions seeking to enjoin enforcement of federal laws. 28 U.S.C. § 2282. See
Michael E. Solimine, Congress, Ex Parte Young, and the Fate of the Three-Judge
District Court, 70 PITT. L. REV. 101, 113 (2008).
74. Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 111-12 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); Cass, supra note 7, at 49.
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sion, convincing government defendants-through the force of
the court's reasoning-to refrain from enforcing the challenged
law.75 If persuasion does not work and coercion becomes neces-
sary, the declaratory judgment can form the basis for a subse-
quent injunction,76 although it requires an additional round of
litigation and a second court order.
Declaratory judgments and injunctions operate as antisuit
remedies. An individual threatened with governmental enforce-
ment of a law against her can seek a federal court order that the
law is constitutionally invalid and enforcement would violate
her constitutional rights. That order could be an injunction pro-
hibiting enforcement of the constitutionally invalid law on pain
of contempt, or it could be a declaration that the constitutionally
invalid law should not be enforced-these are alternatives serv-
ing the same purpose.7 7 In fact, many plaintiffs request a pre-
enforcement injunction where the primary objective is the dec-
laration of rights, not the coercive force of the injunction and
contempt.7 8
Bray rejects "mildness" as the fundamental distinction be-
tween injunctions and declaratory judgments.79 A declaratory
judgment is a court order, having the force and effect of a final
judgment.8 0 A declaration that a law should not be enforced
against an individual frees that individual to engage in consti-
tutionally protected conduct without fear of enforcement; it is of
no matter that the judgment does not command nonenforcement
of the law or carry the pain of contempt.8 1 The real distinction
between the remedies is the greater detail the court can (indeed,
must82) include in an injunction, allowing it to manage and over-
see the parties and their conduct going forward. Declaratory
judgments require less detail and less party management, allow-
ing the court to pronounce the rights without more.8 3
75. Steffel, 415 U.S. at 470-71.
76. 28 U.S.C. § 2202; Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 72-73 (1971).
77. Steffel, 415 U.S. at 466; Mackell, 401 U.S. at 73; Harrison, supra note 32,
at 87-88.
78. EMILY SHERWIN & SAMUEL L. BRAY, AMES, CHAFEE, AND RE ON REMEDIES
1071 (3d ed. 2020).
79. Samuel L. Bray, The Myth of the Mild Declaratory Judgment, 63 DUKE L.J.
1091, 1120-21 (2014).
80. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a).
81. Bray, supra note 79, at 1120-21.
82. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(1)(B), (C).
83. Bray, supra note 79, at 1124-25.
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Choosing between an injunction and a declaratory judgment
thus depends on the needs of the case-whether ongoing court
supervision and management is necessary. That depends, in
turn, on the scope of the constitutional action. An injunction is
essential in structural-reform litigation, where the purpose of
the suit is judicially supervised reform of government institu-
tions, such as schools or prisons.84 A declaratory judgment may
be sufficient in the one-off case in which an individual seeks to
stop enforcement of a law against him but does not require
broader judicial oversight.8 5 Courts may believe the declaration
of rights sufficient because the government "will do [its] duty
when disputed questions have been finally adjudicated and the
rights and liabilities of the parties have been finally deter-
mined."86
But declaratory and injunctive relief present similar prob-
lems of remedial scope. When a court declares that a law should
not be enforced because it is constitutionally invalid-even when
the declaration is not accompanied by an injunction-it must de-
termine against whom the law should not be enforced and by
whom it should not be enforced. In other words, the question re-
mains whether a court can issue a universal/non-particularized
declaratory judgment or whether the declaration must be partic-
ularized to the parties. This affects how courts understand
whether the government defendant is "doing its duty" and "obey-
ing" the declaration of rights.
A declaratory judgment thus should be as party-particular-
ized as an injunction, limited to declaring the rights of the plain-
tiff as against the government defendant, but not extending to
declare the rights of nonplaintiffs or to bind nondefendants. The
declaration establishes that a constitutionally invalid law can-
not be enforced against the plaintiff by the defendant but says
nothing about the enforceability of that law by or against non-
parties. As John Harrison argues:
When a court enjoins an officer from enforcing a statutory
rule, the effect is similar to the repeal of the rule as far as the
plaintiff is concerned. When a court declares that a statutory
84. Id. at 1128; see, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011); MALCOLM M.
FEELY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN STATE:
HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA'S PRIsoNS (1998).
85. Bray, supra note 79, at 1124-25.
86. Martin v. Gross, 380 F. Supp. 3d 169, 172 (D. Mass. 2019).
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rule is not applicable to a party because the rule is unconsti-
tutional, the declaratory judgment again resembles a judicial
act of invalidation with respect to the parties involved.8 7
This understanding is consistent with the text of the Declar-
atory Judgment Act. Section 2201(a) empowers the court to de-
clare the rights or legal relations "of any interested party,"8 8
meaning the determination of rights is specific to the parties,
but it cannot speak to the law or its enforceability in the ab-
stract.8 9 Kevin Walsh's argument about the nature of constitu-
tional actions holds for declaratory relief as it does for
injunctions-it is an in personam claim to stop government offi-
cials from enforcing the law against the plaintiff, not an in rem
claim to stop the law itself.9 0 The requirement of particularity is
not unique to injunctions because any remedy resolves a discrete
dispute between discrete parties to a discrete action and not
beyond.9 1
"Further necessary or proper relief," namely an injunction
against the adverse party, can follow if the declaration proves
insufficient to protect the rights declared against enforcement of
the challenged law.92 But only the plaintiff can seek that further
relief to protect her declared rights. For example, X having ob-
tained a declaratory judgment, it would be incoherent to allow Y
to use X's declaratory judgment to obtain an injunction protect-
ing Y; if X must pursue the less-coercive remedy against
enforcement in a separate step, so must Y. It also would be inco-
herent to allow X to convert her declaratory judgment into an
injunction if the government obeys the judgment as to X but at-
tempts to enforce the challenged law against Y; nonenforcement
as to X has given X what she wants, so an injunction prohibiting
enforcement of the law as to Y is not "necessary" to protect X's
rights. If X cannot protect Y's constitutional rights by bringing a
lawsuit to enforce those rights,93 X cannot protect Y's constitu-
87. Harrison, supra note 32, at 87-88.
88. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2018).
89. Harrison, supra note 32, at 82-83, 82 n.130.
90. Kevin C. Walsh, Judicial Departmentalism: An Introduction, 58 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1713, 1725 (2017).
91. Bray, supra note 7, at 469; Cass, supra note 7, at 7; Morley, Nationwide,
supra note 7, at 616; Morley, Disaggregating, supra note 7, at 7-8; Wasserman,
"Nationwide", supra note 7, at 353; Wasserman, Departmentalism, supra note 7, at
1094-96.
92. 28 U.S.C. § 2202; Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 72 (1971).
93. City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983).
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tional rights by converting her declaratory judgment into a non-
particularized injunction protecting Y.
In endorsing particularity of federal remedies in Doran, the
Supreme Court treated declaratory and injunctive relief as hav-
ing the same scope and purpose ither remedy halts enforce-
ment of the challenged law against the federal plaintiffs, while
either remedy leaves the government free to enforce that law
against others who violate it.94 Moreover, the milder, less-
intrusive, weaker declaratory-judgment medicine should not
have broader nonparty effects than the stronger, more coercive
injunctive medicine. If the injunction only prohibits government
officials from enforcing the challenged law against the parties,
the less-coercive declaratory judgment should only declare that
government officials cannot enforce the challenged law against
the parties.
In Martin v. Gross, in two consolidated individual actions,
the district court declared invalid a Massachusetts law prohibit-
ing secret recording of government officials but declined to en-
join enforcement. 95 According to the court, the declaratory judg-
ment meant government officials could not enforce the law
against the plaintiffs. Enforcement would constitute failure to
"do their duty" and would provide a basis for the court to convert
the declaratory judgment into an injunction, the earlier remedy
having failed to persuade the government to change its con-
duct. 96
But the declaratory judgment did not speak, and should not
have spoken, to the validity of Massachusetts officials enforcing
the law against nonparties. Such enforcement would not have
constituted failure of officials to comply with the judgment or
with their official duties. Had Massachusetts officials continued
to enforce the law against persons who were not party to Martin,
those nonparties would have to join or initiate their own actions
and obtain their own judgments-declaratory, injunctive, or
both-protecting them against enforcement of the law.
III. JUDGMENTS AND OPINIONS, PRECLUSION AND PRECEDENT
A court issues two papers when it decides a case: a judgment
and an opinion. Failure to distinguish these papers, their mean-
94. Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975).




ing, and their effects explains some of the confusion over the
scope of remedies.
A. Judgments
The binding judgment resolves constitutional litigation in-
volving one plaintiff, one defendant, one law, and one constitu-
tional right.97 Will Baude argues that the root of the judicial
power under Article III is the authority to "issue binding judg-
ments and to settle legal disputes within the court's jurisdiction.
But judgments settle only those legal disputes, not others."98
A judgment must be obeyed by the parties and enforced by
the executive, even if erroneous.99 A party cannot avoid its obli-
gation to obey a judgment and cannot avoid contempt on the
grounds that the judgment is wrong. Under the "collateral bar
rule," a party cannot disobey an injunction and challenge the
contempt finding on the ground that the underlying injunction
is erroneous or invalid. 100 An erroneous judgment can be chal-
lenged and corrected only through established judicial processes,
such as appellate review of the judgment, subject to the proce-
dural rules and limits that Congress and the courts put in
place.101 But the enjoined party must obey that judgment while
appellate review proceeds unless the injunction is stayed pend-
ing review.10 2 The completion of appellate review produces an
Article III final judgment, which cannot be questioned or undone
by the other branches103 and is subject to limited judicial recon-
sideration.104 A court may enforce that final judgment on its own
97. Baude, supra note 66, at 1811; Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The
Executive Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267, 1327
(1996); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanations
for Judgments, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 43, 44-45 (1993); Pushaw, supra note 66, at
860; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 58.
98. Baude, supra note 66, at 1811.
99. Id. at 1826; Harrison, supra note 32, at 87; Pushaw, supra note 66, at 860;
Wasserman, Departmentalism, supra note 7, at 1105, 1110-11; but see Lawson &
Moore, supra note 97, at 1325.
100. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 314-16 (1967).
101. Id. at 314.
102. Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009); Josh Blackman & Howard M.
Wasserman, The Process of Marriage Equality, 43 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 243, 283
(2017).
103. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218-19 (1995); Lawson &
Moore, supra note 97, at 1319.
104. See FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b); Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367,
379-80 (1992).
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or on request of a party, including by holding noncompliant par-
ties in contempt of court and ordering them jailed. 0 5
But any judgment is particularized to the litigation at issue
and, therefore, to the parties to that litigation.106 Only parties
are bound to abide by the judgment, and the court's enforcement
powers-such as contempt-are limited to the parties.
This is obvious with the judgment in an enforcement action.
Imagine the government initiates a proceeding to enforce a law
against X, X defends on the grounds that the law is inconsistent
with the Constitution, and the court agrees with X that the law
is constitutionally invalid and cannot be enforced as the rule of
decision in the case. The court dismisses the enforcement action
and enters judgment in favor of X and against the government.
But this judgment goes no further, speaking to no person other
than X. And no one believes or argues otherwise.
It should follow that a judgment in a pre-enforcement Ex
parte Young action for declaratory or injunctive relief to halt fu-
ture enforcement of the challenged law should be as particular-
ized as the action enforcing that law. That judgment should pro-
tect the plaintiff against enforcement but should not protect
nonparties against separate enforcement. Bray argues that a
"federal court should give an injunction that protects the plain-
tiff vis-A-vis the defendant, wherever the plaintiff and the
defendant may both happen to be. The injunction should not con-
strain the defendant's conduct vis-A-vis nonparties."1 0 7 Laycock
offers a similar framing-the "court in an individual action
should not globally prohibit a government agency from enforcing
an invalid regulation; the court should order only that the inva-
lid regulation not be enforced against the individual
plaintiff."108
A pre-enforcement action anticipates government enforce-
ment, and the pre-enforcement remedy prevents that antici-
pated enforcement. The rights-holder's offensive effort to stop
enforcement before it begins is symmetrical to her defensive ef-
fort to defeat enforcement once undertaken. The rights-holder's
goal in both is to halt enforcement of the challenged law against
105. FED. R. CIV. P. 70; 28 U.S.C. §§ 401-402 (2018); see Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S.
327, 335-36 (1977); Miller v. Caudill, 936 F.3d 442, 446 (6th Cir. 2019); Reynolds
v. Roberts, 207 F.3d 1288, 1297 (11th Cir. 2000).
106. Baude, supra note 66, at 1826; Pushaw, supra note 66, at 860.
107. Bray, supra note 7, at 469.
108. Id. at 469 n.10.
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her. If the judgment in the enforcement action would be limited
to the rights-holder, the judgment in the pre-enforcement action
should go no further.
The effect of either judgment is controlled by the law of judg-
ments and the law of preclusion.10 9 The final judgment resolves
the dispute between parties and is enforceable to ensure that
those parties comply. Preclusion then limits the right to reliti-
gate, in a new action, the legal and factual issues considered and
resolved by that judgment.110 Like the judgment, preclusion is
limited to the parties to the first action and judgment or to those
with a close or privity connection with them; preclusion does not
affect those unconnected to the original litigation and the judg-
ment resolving that litigation.111
Courts have relaxed this rule somewhat by allowing nonmu-
tual preclusion-a nonparty to Court I avails herself of the pre-
clusive effect of the.judgment against a party to Court I, who is
denied another bite at the apple in Court II.1 12 But under United
States v. Mendoza,113 nonparties cannot use preclusion against
the federal government or federal officials,114 a principle that
some courts have extended to state governments and officials. 115
That is, a nonparty to the judgment in Court I cannot use non-
mutual preclusion against the federal or state governments (or
officials) to resolve new litigation before Court II. If Court II is
considering actual or threatened enforcement against Y, Y can-
not argue that the constitutional question has been resolved
against the government by Court I's judgment as to X and that
preclusion binds Court II to reach the same conclusion on the
constitutional question.
This point has been the target of recent scholarly criticism.
Zachary Clopton and Alan Trammell independently argue that
109. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Fact and Fiction About Facial Challenges, 99 CALIF.
L. REV. 915, 924 n.31 (2011) [hereinafter Fallon, Fact]; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-
Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321,
1339-40 (2000) [hereinafter Fallon, As Applied]; Harrison, supra note 32, at 88;
Adam N. Steinman, Case Law, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1947, 1957 (2017).
110. Clopton, supra note 6, at 10-13; Trammell, supra note 6, at 92-95; see
United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 158 (1984).
111. Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 159-60; Clopton, supra note 6, at 10-13; Harrison,
supra note 32, at 88.
112. Clopton, supra note 6, at 12-13; Trammell, supra note 6, at 95.
113. 464 U.S. 154 (1984).
114. Id. at 162.
115. Idaho Potato Comm'n v. G&T Terminal Packaging, Inc., 425 F.3d 708, 713-
14 (9th Cir. 2005); Morley, Nationwide, supra note 7, at 623-24.
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Mendoza was wrongly decided and that Congress or courts
should overrule or narrow it.116 This would allow nonparties in
Court I to obtain the preclusive benefits of the constitutional rul-
ing to bar or halt the government from future enforcement
against them in Court II. Y could argue that Court I's judgment
as to X resolved the question of the law's constitutional validity
against the government after the government had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the constitutional issue. That judgment
would bind Court II, requiring it to find the law constitutionally
invalid and unenforceable in an action involving Y, without Y
having to relitigate the constitutional issue and without the gov-
ernment having a second opportunity to litigate the constitu-
tional issue on which it lost.
Clopton and Trammell both tie limiting or overruling Men-
doza to the scope-of-injunction debate. Both authors argue that
if, in a non-Mendoza world, a nonparty can benefit from Court
I's judgment via nonmutual preclusion, then Court I should-in
an appropriate case-be able to skip the middle step and directly
protect nonparties via a universal/non-particularized injunc-
tion.117  Nonmutual preclusion and non-particularized
injunctions give nonparties the benefits of Court I's injunction;
the latter protects nonparties more directly and without the
need for additional litigation in Court II.
The problem with this argument is that the scope of a judg-
ment and the scope of preclusion need not be coextensive. Ex-
panding the preclusive effect of a judgment does not require ex-
panding the permissible scope of that judgment. The symmetry
between a judgment in an enforcement action and a judgment in
the corresponding pre-enforcement action demonstrates why.
Suppose Mendoza were overruled. The government initiates
an enforcement action against X, who defends on the grounds
that the law at issue is constitutionally invalid; Court I agrees
and dismisses the action against X. Without Mendoza and with
nonmutual preclusion available against the government, Y could
assert preclusion based on that judgment in a subsequent en-
forcement action. Y could argue that Court II is bound by the
judgment of Court I on the constitutional issue, without Y hav-
ing to litigate the issue and without the government having an
opportunity to relitigate the issue on which it lost. But the judg-
116. Clopton, supra note 6, at 37; Trammell, supra note 6, at 99-102.




ment of Court I would not protect anyone other than X, regard-
less of how anyone might wield its preclusive effect in
subsequent litigation. The government would violate that judg-
ment, and be subject to contempt, only by attempting to enforce
against X, not against any nonparty.
The same should hold if the judgment from Court I came in
a pre-enforcement Ex parte Young action by X. Broadening the
preclusive effect of that judgment need not broaden the judg-
ment and injunction itself. Regardless of the posture of the liti-
gation that produced Court I's judgment, the preclusive effect of
that judgment matters for subsequent litigation, in which Court
II decides what preclusive effect to accord Court I's prior
judgment. 118
B. Opinions
The opinion, the second paper the court issues, is a reasoned
explanation justifying the judgment. Opinions are "essays writ-
ten by judges explaining why they rendered the judgment they
did. The primary significance of these essays for nonjudicial ac-
tors is the guidance they provide in predicting future judicial be-
havior."119 Opinions "explain the grounds for judgments,
helping other people to plan and order their affairs."120 This giv-
ing of reasons for an outcome represents a hallmark of judicial
decision-making.12 1
Court I's opinion-explaining why a law is constitutionally
valid or invalid and justifying the judgment-serves as prece-
dent for Court II in considering the constitutional validity of that
law or a similar law in a separate action involving a different
rights-holder. Precedential force varies by court.122 A district
court opinion as to the validity of a law has persuasive force for
the next court, including for judges within that district, but no
118. Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299, 307 (2011).
119. Merrill, supra note 97, at 62. Oliver Wendell Holmes famously defined all
law as "the prediction of the incidence of the public force through the
instrumentality of the courts." Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10
HARV. L. REV. 457, 457 (1897).
120. Baude, supra note 66, at 1844; Lawson & Moore, supra note 97, at 1327;
Merrill, supra note 97, at 44-45, 62.
121. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits ofAdjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353,
387-88 (1978).
122. Randy J. Kozel, The Scope of Precedent, 113 MICH. L. REV. 179, 185-86
(2014).
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binding force.123 A regional court of appeals' opinion has binding
force on other panels of that circuit (and can be reversed only by
that circuit sitting en banc) and on district courts within its cir-
cuit, but persuasive force on courts of appeals and trial courts
elsewhere. A Supreme Court decision has binding force on all
courts in all circuits and districts and in all state courts.124
There are debates and confusion about when a judicial deci-
sion establishes precedent, what that precedent is, and how
courts can tell. 125 While important questions, they are beyond
the current point that precedent governs a judicial decision's
prospective nonparty effects-on government officials and
rights-holders forming their primary conduct in the real world
and on courts and parties to future litigation. 126 The effect of
binding precedent (whatever its scope) continues until a decision
is overruled by the issuing court or a higher court. 127 Persuasive
precedent allows different courts to decide issues in their own
ways, depending on how convincing they find prior opinions.
The other significant feature of precedent is that it can
change. 128 While the opinion allows government officials and in-
dividuals to arrange their primary conduct going forward,129 all
must account for the possibility of change in organizing their en-
forcement activities. 130 This leaves everyone with freedom and
with uncertainty. Laws that government officials believe unen-
forceable under current precedent remain on the books and may
become enforceable with a change in precedent. Laws they be-
123. Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 709 n.7 (2011); ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish,
490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989); Fallon, Fact, supra note 109, at 924 n.31; Fallon, As-
Applied, supra note 109, at 1340; but see Morley, Disaggregating, supra note 7, at
53 (proposing that district court opinions be given intradistrict or intracircuit stare
decisis effect).
124. Cass, supra note 7, at 47-49; Fallon, Fact, supra note 109, at 923 n.31;
Fallon, As-Applied, supra note 109, at 1339; Harrison, supra note 32, at 88;
Steinman, supra note 109, at 1957.
125. See generally RANDY J. KOZEL, SETTLED VERSUS RIGHT: A THEORY OF
PRECEDENT (2017); Steinman, supra note 109, at 1950; Richard M. Re, Narrowing
Supreme Court Precedent From Below, 104 GEO. L.J. 921 (2016); Richard M. Re,
Narrowing Precedent in the Supreme Court, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1861 (2014);
Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571 (1987).
126. Baude, supra note 66, at 1844; Lawson & Moore, supra note 97, at 1327;
Merrill, supra note 97, at 44-45, 62.
127. Jonathan F. Mitchell, The Writ-of-Erasure Fallacy, 104 VA. L. REV. 933,
946-47, 1017 (2018).
128. Walsh, supra note 90, at 1715.
129. Baude, supra note 66, at 1844; Lawson & Moore, supra note 97, at 1327;
Merrill, supra note 97, at 44-45, 62.
130. Mitchell, supra note 127, at 1008.
1022 [Vol. 91
CONCEPTS, NOT NOMENCLATURE
lieve enforceable may cease to be so with a change in prece-
dent. 131 Conduct that individuals believe they may constitution-
ally engage in free from government restriction may lose its
constitutional protection and become subject to restriction with
a change in precedent.132 Conduct that individuals believe to be
prohibited may gain constitutional protection and become per-
missible with a change in precedent.
C. Judgments, Opinions, and Non-Particularity
Universal/non-particularized injunctions grant courts
broader authority to establish the parameters of constitutional
law for other persons, beyond resolving the case at hand.133 But
the judgment need not perform that function, either directly via
an injunction protecting the universe of targets or indirectly via
nonmutual preclusion. Instead, the opinion performs that func-
tion. The opinion provides the decision's wider prospective
nonparty authority through the law of precedent and stare deci-
sis. The opinion protects other rights-holders by establishing the
parameters of constitutional law and constitutional rights for fu-
ture litigation.13 4
Judgment and precedent operate differently within the ju-
dicial hierarchy. A district court opinion is not binding
precedent, even on other judges within the district.13 5 But an
unstayed district court judgmentl36 is and remains binding on
the parties, carrying the same force and effect on those parties
as an injunction that has been reviewed and affirmed by a higher
court. While in effect, the district court injunction places en-
joined government officials in the same position as though the
injunction was affirmed on review or as though officials declined
to seek review. That force remains unless and until the judgment
is reversed by a higher court. Allowing universal/non-
particularized injunctions thus expands the power and force of
131. Id. at 987.
132. Id. at 948, 987-88.
133. Frost, supra note 6, at 1087-89, 1092-95; Malveaux, supra note 6, at 62-
63.
134. Baude, supra note 66, at 1844; Fallon, Fact, supra note 109, at 923 n.31;
Fallon, As Applied, supra note 109, at 1339; Merill, supra note 97, at 44-45; Morley,
Disaggregating, supra note 7, at 24-25, 39-40.
135. See supra notes 125-130.
136. Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009); Blackman & Wasserman, supra
note 102, at 283.
2020] 1023
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW
one district judge, giving her judgment force that her opinion
lacks as precedent.
Similarly, Supreme Court affirmance of the district court's
judgment does not expand the injunction. If the district court
entered a non-universal/particularized injunction, the Supreme
Court affirms a non-universal/particularized injunction; the in-
junction does not gain broader scope or force to protect beyond
the parties.
Supreme Court affirmance does mean all future enforce-
ment efforts necessarily fail and all pre-enforcement actions to
enjoin enforcement necessarily succeed, because all courts are
bound by the Supreme Court's opinion pronouncing that the
challenged law is constitutionally defective and not enforcea-
ble.137 But the affirmance resolves the question as a matter of
the law of precedent-the binding precedential effect of the Su-
preme Court's opinion on any subsequent court deciding a legal
issue arising from a new government threat or attempt to en-
force the law against nonparties to the first case (who are not
protected by the judgment). The affirmance is not a function of
the law of judgments or of a non-particularized injunction pro-
hibiting enforcement against those nonparties.
Preclusion and precedent empower the later court. Court II
decides the scope and meaning of the precedent set by Court I's
opinion and whether and how to apply it in resolving the new
action. Similarly, the preclusive effect of Court I's judgment "is
usually the bailiwick of the second court."13 8 Following a judg-
ment from Court I, the parties in Court II raise the preclusive
effect of that judgment before Court II; Court II decides whether
preclusion applies and the scope of that preclusion.
The trend toward universal/non-particularized injunctions
reflects judicial impatience with this adjudicative process. Uni-
versality/non-particularity seeks to empower Court I to control
the adjudicative process at the expense of Court II. And it ex-
tends the judgment and the law of judgments to swallow the
opinion and the law of precedent.
Court I, having declared the challenged law constitutionally
invalid in Case I and having extended its judgment beyond the
parties, strips Court II of the opportunity (or at least the
137. Blackman & Wasserman, supra note 102, at 252-53; Steinman, supra note
109, at 1957; Walsh, supra note 90, at 1715, 1727-28.
138. Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299, 307 (2011) (emphasis in original); see
supra notes 117-119 and accompanying text.
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need)139 to adjudicate the same issue involving different parties.
By issuing a universal/non-particularized injunction, Court I
can prevent Court II from deciding either the scope of Court I's
judgment and injunction or the meaning of its opinion as prece-
dent. Court I issues the lone controlling judgment and opinion
on the law's constitutional validity and prohibits all enforcement
of that law against anyone, subject only to reversal by its re-
gional circuit or by the Supreme Court. By issuing the lone,
universally binding judgment and opinion, Court I can guard
both through its enforcement and contempt powers, cutting off
any opportunity for disagreement by the parties or by another
court.
Supporters of universal/non-particularized injunctions re-
ject individual, atomized litigation of constitutional rights, fear-
ing a flood of duplicative litigation in which each affected indi-
vidual or entity must file its own action and obtain its own
injunction.140 For example, in imposing a universal/non-partic-
ularized injunction in an action challenging regulations strip-
ping federal funds from "sanctuary cities," the Northern District
of Illinois emphasized that thirty-seven counties and cities had
filed an amicus brief in that action.14 1 Because all had been
heard in this case, judicial economy counseled against compel-
ling each to file a separate lawsuit to have a separate court
resolve legal issues already addressed. 142
But multiple or successive litigation is not duplicative liti-
gation. Rather, multiple or successive litigation is necessary to
create precedent-persuasive and binding-that subsequent
courts can use to guide resolution of subsequent cases. Multiple
precedents from multiple litigation in multiple courts allow "per-
colation of legal questions" through different district courts and
courts of appeals, allowing each court to reach its own conclu-
sion, pending final resolution by the Supreme Court. 143 Allowing
universal/non-particularized injunctions to preempt further liti-
gation preempts the creation of new precedent.
139. See infra Part IV.
140. City of Chicago v. Sessions, 2017 WL 4572208, *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 13, 2017);
Frost, supra note 6, at 1101; Malveaux, supra note 6, at 61-62; Pedro, supra note
6, at 851-52, 865; Trammell, supra note 6, at 112.
141. City of Chicago, 2017 WL 4572208, at *3.
142. Id.
143. Bray, supra note 79, at 420; Wasserman, "Nationwide", supra note 7, at
383.
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Although not a constitutional case, Nevada v. United States
Department of Labor offers a bizarre example of the problems
created by this sort of judicial reach. Several states and business
organizations sued in the Eastern District of Texas, challeng-
ing-under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)-the validity
of Department of Labor (DOL) regulations raising the salary line
at which employees become exempt from overtime requirements
(that is, broadening the class of employees entitled to overtime
pay). The district court issued a universal/non-particularized
preliminary injunction prohibiting enforcement of the regula-
tions,144 then granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs.145
A Chipotle employee named Carmen Alvarez, represented
by counsel, filed a separate action in the District of New Jersey,
alleging that the company had denied her overtime payments in
violation of the DOL regulations.146 The Eastern District of
Texas found Alvarez and her lawyers in contempt of its original
injunction; because the injunction was universal/non-
particularized, their attempts to enforce a regulation that the
court had determined was unenforceable violated a court order
to which they were subject. 147
More than a year later, the Fifth Circuit reversed the con-
tempt finding, rejecting the argument that Alvarez or her attor-
neys were in privity with DOL, given the absence of evidence of
an express or implied legal relationship under which DOL could
be said to represent Alvarez's interests.148 The court added,
"[m]ore generally, Chipotle's theory that the DOL represents
every worker's legal interests through its enforcement of the
FLSA so as to bind every worker in the United States to an in-
junction where the DOL is the only bound party lacks authori-
tative support."149 Federal labor law gave individuals unique le-
gal rights and the opportunity to enforce those rights in private
litigation when violated by a particular actor, distinct from the
power of the federal government o enforce federal labor law. 150
Had the district court's original injunction been properly
particularized, precedent could have done the work here, rather
than judgment and contempt. Alvarez's action against Chipotle
144. Nevada v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 218 F. Supp. 3d 520 (E.D. Tex. 2016).
145. Nevada v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 275 F. Supp. 3d 795 (E.D. Tex. 2017).
146. Nevada v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 321 F. Supp. 3d 709, 720 (E.D. Tex. 2018).
147. Id. at 720, 726.
148. Texas v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 929 F.3d 205, 208 (5th Cir. 2019).




should have gone forward with Chipotle urging the District of
New Jersey to agree with the Eastern District of Texas's opinion
that the overtime regulations were invalid and unenforceable as
to Alvarez and to resolve the lawsuit against her and in favor of
Chipotle.15 1 Alternatively, because the Eastern District of Texas
would not have been binding authority on the District of New
Jersey, the latter court could have reached a different legal con-
clusion about the regulations' validity and ruled in favor of Al-
varez.152 This would have created a division of authority on the
legal question. Either way, this shows the law of precedent and
percolation in action.
Mila Sohoni shows that the Supreme Court has long af-
firmed injunctions that, by their terms, prohibit government
conduct as a universal and categorical matter and are not lim-
ited to the plaintiffs. 153 This includes some of the Court's most
significant constitutional cases,154 in which the Court intended
and the public understood the Court to have stopped all enforce-
ment of the constitutionally infirm laws, not only enforcement
against the plaintiffs.
As one example, Sohoni offers West Virginia Board of Edu-
cation v. Barnette,155 in which the Court held that the First
Amendment prohibited states from compelling school children to
stand and recite the Pledge of Allegiance. Sohoni argues that if,
the day after Barnette, the federal government compelled stu-
dents in D.C. schools to salute the flag, "there is no basis in Ar-
ticle III for thinking that such a hypothetical case would have or
should have come out any differently than Barnette did." 156
151. To the extent there was privity among DOL, Alvarez, and her attorneys,
that should have been left for a preclusion analysis, not judgment and contempt, in
the second court. Chipotle could have urged the District of New Jersey to apply
nonmutual defensive preclusion based on that privity but left that court to
determine the first injunction's preclusive effect. But the Eastern District of Texas
did not want to surrender that control. And the overbroad universal/non-
particularized injunction it issued in Nevada's lawsuit allowed it to maintain that
control over the legal issues in a subsequent case, even as to nonparties.
152. That would have remained true had the Fifth Circuit affirmed on appeal in
Nevada. A court of appeals decision is persuasive to, but not binding on, a district
court in a different circuit; the District of New Jersey is not in the Fifth Circuit. See
supra notes 122-125.
153. Sohoni, supra note 6, at 926-28; Pfander & Wentzel, supra note 6
(manuscript at 57).
154. Sohoni, supra note 6, at 989-90; see, e.g., W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624 (1943); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
155. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
156. Sohoni, supra note 6, at 991.
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Sohoni is correct that the subsequent court in this hypothet-
ical case would have reached the same result as Barnette. But
the reason would have been the law of precedent and the binding
nature of Supreme Court opinions, not the scope of the injunc-
tion. The Court, having declared in Barnette that compulsory
flag salutes violate the First Amendment, established binding
precedent; that precedent required lower courts to declare inva-
lid similar government attempts to compel the salute. The new
dispute would have been litigated in the District of the District
of Columbia, with that court resolving new litigation involving
new parties based on binding precedent. The court would apply
the binding precedent of the Barnette opinion and conclude that
D.C.'s attempted compulsion violated the First Amendment.
In fact, however, the hypothetical D.C. case would have
reached the same result had the Barnette injunction been non-
universal/particularized. But this would have had nothing to do
with the injunction and judgment in Barnette itself. The district
court in West Virginia-which issued and must oversee and
manage the injunction affirmed in Barnette-would play no role
in the new D.C. dispute. The judgment and injunction from Bar-
nette would be irrelevant to any subsequent litigation. The opin-
ion and precedent do the work.
This distinction addresses Pedro's discussion of a real-world
example, in which a district court in 1963 attempted to "re-
decide" Brown v. Board of Education.157 The Fifth Circuit
quickly and forcefully reversed. The court of appeals stated that
"the District Court was bound by the decision of the Supreme
Court in Brown. We reiterate that no inferior federal court may
refrain from acting as required by that decision even if such a
court should conclude that the Supreme Court erred either as to
its facts or as to the law."158 The court continued:
Thus was the Savannah case ended then, and there it must
end now. We do not read the major premise of the decision of
the Supreme Court in the first Brown case as being limited
to the facts of the cases there presented. We read it as pro-
scribing segregation in the public education process on the
stated ground that separate but equal schools for the races
were inherently unequal. This being our interpretation of the
157. Pedro, supra note 6, at 854; see Stell v. Savannah-Chatham Cty. Bd. of
Educ., 220 F. Supp. 667 (S.D. Ga. 1963), rev'd, 333 F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1964).
158. Stell, 333 F.2d at 61.
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teaching of that decision, it follows that it would be entirely
inappropriate for it to be rejected or obviated by this court. 159
But, as with Sohoni's hypothetical reaction to Barnette, the
Fifth Circuit's analysis sounds in precedent and the binding
force of the Brown opinion on lower courts, not in judgment and
the force of the injunction affirmed in Brown. The district court
in Stell erred in allowing the parties to offer evidence and argu-
ments showing the wrongness of Brown. 160 The Fifth Circuit's
point was that it and the district court were bound to follow and
apply Brown to new litigation involving new parties and new
facts, such that a new injunction against the Savannah-
Chatham Board's actions was legally required. That court did
not say that the Board was subject to, and thus in violation of,
an existing injunction. Again, that would have been the baili-
wick of the trial court in the District of Kansas overseeing the
injunction against the Topeka Board that the Supreme Court af-
firmed in Brown.
IV. AN UNNECESSARY DISTRACTION
Universality/non-particularity ultimately represents an un-
necessary and unfortunate distraction. Courts employ language
weighted with rhetorical baggage and uncertain meaning1 6 1
when they label an injunction nationwide or universal but fail to
recognize the consequences of that rhetoric. Accepting that the
Supreme Court has been approving, on paper, universal injunc-
tions for years,1 62 neither courts nor litigants have taken that
universality seriously, then or now. Nor do they follow univer-
sality to its logical conclusion. The purportedly universal/non-
particularized scope of the injunction thus diverts attention from
significant legal and constitutional issues while having no prac-
tical effect.
Litigation over Trump Administration regulations estab-
lishing a religious exemption from the Affordable Care Act's con-
traception mandate illustrates the problem. Two district courts
agreed the regulations violated the Administrative Procedure
Act and enjoined enforcement. The Eastern District of Pennsyl-
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Pedro, supra note 6, at 870-71.
162. Sohoni, supra note 6, at 924-26.
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vania made the injunction universal (while incorrectly labeling
it "nationwide") and offered detailed justifications for that uni-
versality.163 The Third Circuit affirmed, including as to
scope.164 The Northern District of California particularized its
injunction to the plaintiff states. 165
On review of the California case, the Ninth Circuit ordered
the parties to brief whether the Pennsylvania universal/non-par-
ticularized injunction mooted the California case and whether
the mootness analysis changed because the universal injunction
came from a district court in another regional circuit.166 The
court of appeals divided on the answer; the majority held that
the case was not moot. 167 But the path to that result exposed the
problems that arise when courts make their injunctions
universal/non-particularized, fail to take non-particularity seri-
ously, and misuse and confuse the nomenclature.
Dissenting in the Ninth Circuit, Judge Andrew Kleinfeld
captured the real problem:
That nationwide injunction means that the preliminary in-
junction before us is entirely without effect. If we affirm, as
the majority does, nothing is stopped that the Pennsylvania
injunction has not already stopped. Were we to reverse, and
direct that the district court injunction be vacated, the rule
would still not go into effect, because of the Pennsylvania in-
junction. Nothing the district court in our case did, or that we
do, matters. We are talking to the air, without practical con-
sequence. Whatever differences there may be in the reason-
ing for our decision and the Third Circuit's have no material
significance, because they do not change the outcome at all;
the new regulation cannot come into effect. 168
The majority missed the point in several respects.
163. Pennsylvania v. Trump, 351 F. Supp. 3d 791, 830-35 (E.D. Pa. 2019).
164. Pennsylvania v. President of the United States, 930 F.3d 543, 575-76 (3d
Cir. 2019).
165. California v. Health & Human Servs., 351 F. Supp. 3d 1267, 1300-01 (N.D.
Cal. 2019).
166. California v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Order of Apr. 29, 2019.
167. California v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 941 F.3d 410, 422 (9th
Cir. 2019).
168. Id. at 434 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
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First, it insisted that the California and Pennsylvania in-
junctions complemented rather than conflicted.169 The real
problem, however, was that the injunctions duplicated: The uni-
versal Pennsylvania injunction, purporting to protect the
California plaintiffs, rendered a California injunction superflu-
ous. The California plaintiffs faced no real or imminent harm
from the challenged regulations while the Pennsylvania injunc-
tion remained in effect. The United States could not and would
not enforce the revised mandate against the California plain-
tiffs; any attempt to do so would violate that universal/non-
particularized injunction and could be halted with a motion ask-
ing the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to enforce its order.
Critics of universal/non-particularized injunctions invoke
the risk of conflicting decisions-either plaintiffs jump from
court to court until they find a judge who agrees the challenged
law is constitutionally invalid and will universally enjoin en-
forcement17 0 (what Bray refers to as "shopping until the statute
drops")171 or one court orders the government to take some ac-
tion and another court orders the government to refrain from
that action, placing the government in a position where it will
violate a court order no matter what it does.17 2
The contraception-mandate cases reveal a third problem.
Because of the universal/non-particularized injunction, the
rights of the California plaintiffs no longer were violated or at
risk of being violated. And if they were, the Eastern District-
the court that issued the universal/non-particularized injunc-
tion-could protect those rights by enforcing its judgment. The
litigation in the Ninth Circuit and the Northern District of Cal-
ifornia was superfluous because the relief in that case did not
provide California with new legal protections that the existing
overbroad Eastern District injunction did not provide.173
169. Id. at 422.
170. Bray, supra note 79, at 460; Wasserman, "Nationwide", supra note 7, at
363-64.
171. Bray, supra note 79, at 460.
172. Id. at 362; Wasserman, "Nationwide", supra note 7, at 383-84.
173. The majority rejected mootness because the Eastern District injunction was
preliminary and the subject of a Supreme Court petition for writ of certiorari.
California v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 941 F.3d 410, 422-23 (9th Cir.
2019). Bray argues that the proper focus should have been not Article III mootness
but equitable mootness and the lack of an equitable need for the court to address or
resolve the issue. Samuel Bray, National Injunctions and Equitable Mootness,
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Apr. 30, 2019), https://reason.com/2019/04/30/national-
injunctions-and-equitable-mootness/ [https://perma.cc/V9AV-CLYN].
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Second, the Ninth Circuit majority declined to conclude that
it lacked jurisdiction to issue an injunction affecting conduct cov-
ered by a prior injunction, because that would be akin to declar-
ing that the Eastern District (and the affirming Third Circuit)
"plainly acted beyond its jurisdiction" in issuing its universal in-
junction. 174 The court preferred not to intrude on a sister federal
court. The Ninth Circuit was correct in one respect: the Eastern
District overstepped in issuing that broad injunction. But while
the Eastern District and Third Circuit's error lies beyond the
Ninth Circuit's corrective power, it should not provide a basis for
that court to commit the distinct error of issuing an injunction
lacking practical effect.
Third, the Ninth Circuit majority expressed concern that
the Eastern District injunction might go away, either because it
was reversed on appeal or because it was preliminary and might
be superseded by denial of a permanent injunction.17 5 That
would leave the California plaintiffs unprotected and in need of
a new injunction. But the possibility of future need does not
change present reality-at the time the Ninth Circuit was asked
to rule, the California plaintiffs could not be the targets of en-
forcement, were not being injured or suffering violations of their
rights, and did not need the new injunction. A properly scoped
Pennsylvania injunction would not have affected the California
plaintiffs (who were not party to that case), making it clear to
the Ninth Circuit that they needed the California injunction to
protect their rights.
Finally, although not discussed in the opinion, the Ninth
Circuit suffered from nomenclature confusion when it ques-
tioned the effect of the competing injunction coming from a
district court outside the circuit. All injunctions are (and should
be) nationwide, in that they protect a protected party every-
where he is or he may go.176 A plaintiff protected against
enforcement of a law is protected against enforcement wherever
she is, and the bound government is prohibited from enforcing
wherever the target is. It follows that if a court has the power to
protect nonparties (through universal/non-particularized in-
junctions), then it protects those nonparties everywhere they go.
If the Eastern District had the power to issue this universal/non-
particularized injunction prohibiting enforcement against all po-
174. California, 941 F.3d at 422.
175. Id. at 423.
176. See supra Part I.
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tential targets of the regulations, that injunction protected those
targets everywhere they might have gone, including within Cal-
ifornia and the Ninth Circuit.
The Ninth Circuit's consideration and resolution of this
question exposes the emptiness of the scope-of-injunction de-
bate. The practice of issuing universal/non-particularized in-
junctions has not produced a world in which one injunction ends
all litigation by prohibiting enforcement of the challenged law as
to all persons. There has been no loss of percolation, contrary to
critics' fears-multiple plaintiffs continue to bring multiple ac-
tions, producing multiple court orders judging the constitutional
validity and enforceability of the challenged laws. 177
That parties continue to pursue additional litigation and
that courts continue to consider constitutional questions and to
issue orders, however, reveals the real problem. No one is seri-
ous about purportedly universal/non-particularized injunctions
and no one follows universality/non-particularity to its true con-
clusion. Not the courts issuing purportedly universal injunctions
who choose not to wield their power to enforce their orders and
hold government officials in contempt. Not the plaintiffs who
continue pursuing separate litigation despite an existing
universal/non-particularized injunction that by its terms pro-
tects them. And not the later courts who hear subsequent cases
and issue subsequent injunctions that are, in practice,
superfluous.
CONCLUSION
The real question becomes why courts should or do bother
with universality or non-particularity. Courts and parties could
avoid uncertainty and confusion-and end an academic and ju-
risprudential debate-by keeping their injunctions to them-
selves. Orders and judgments, whether injunctions or declara-
tory judgments, should be particularized to the parties before
the court and protect those parties everywhere they are or might
go. But those orders and judgments should not protect or purport
to protect anyone else. They should be accompanied by an opin-
ion having some precedential effect (depending on the court) on
future litigation involving different persons in different courts.
177. Frost, supra note 6, at 1108-09; Spencer E. Amdur & David Hausman,
Nationwide Injunctions and Nationwide Harm, 131 HARV. L. REV. F. 49, 53 (2017).
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By adopting the approach proposed here, courts need not
worry about qualifiers such as "universal" or "particularized" or
"non-particularized" or "nationwide" or "cosmic." They can
simply issue "injunctions." And everyone will know what an in-
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